TwentiethcongressCPSU, took place in Moscow on February 14-25, 1956.Best known for condemning the cult of personality and, indirectly,Stalin's ideological legacy.Report by N.S. Khrushchev onXXCongress of the CPSU “On the cult of personality and its consequences” was called “secret”.
The 20th Congress was contradictory, just as the processes that took place in society, in the party, and in the upper echelon of power were contradictory. However, the entire course of debate at the congress did not reflect the complexities and contradictions of the period being experienced.
There was another part of the work of the congress, which the Presidium of the Central Committee decided to conduct in extreme secrecy. The delegates were ready to hear something very important concerning Stalin, since before the start of the congress they had been sent Lenin’s works that had not previously been published in the open press: an appeal to the XII Party Congress - the so-called “Testament”, letters on the national question and other documents. In addition, the delegates were informed that at the congress N.S. Khrushchev will give a report on the cult of personality.The “secret” report was printed in a circulation of 1 million.copies and read aloud at party meetings in all party organizations in the country. So ohall communists were notified of Stalin's crimesyou are the Soviet Union, and in the retelling - almost everythingpopulation of the country. This meant a fundamental changeideological and political atmosphere.XXthe congress has become a simthe ox of renewal and humanism, awakened to activesocial life for an entire generation. "ChildrenXXexit“yes” - that’s what the participants were called decades latersocial movement in the USSR 1960-1980s.The reaction to Khrushchev's report both in the party and in the country was ambiguous: from complete support to complete rejection.
Revelations of N. S. Khrushchev caused discontentstaunch adherents of Stalin's policies, of whom there were many in the ranks of the CPSU. There were also demonstrations protesting the report. In Tbilisi, wherecondemnation of Stalin’s “personality cult” was perceived as an insult to the national hero, March 4, 1956 at
students came out into the streets.
On the other hand, the revelations of the “cult of personality” of I.V. Stalin encouraged many Soviet people to go further than N.S. Khrushchev, first of all, ask the question about the participation of the current leaders in mass repressions, about their responsibility for lawlessness.In general, the report and resolution of the Central Committee “On overcoming the cult of personality and its consequences” were acceptedrather positive. Undoubtedly, the cessation of massThe new repressions were a blessing for all residents of the USSR. OdHowever, the disappearance of constant pressure on the elite has broughtThis meant that the upper strata of society (“party nomenklatura”) became uncontrollable by anyone. DemocraticThere was no control “from below” over the ruling layers in the USSR before, and now dictatorialcontrol from above. Possibility of entering into these rulesthe layers and the advancement within them have become more and morehang not on a person’s business qualities, but solely on his personal devotion to his superiorSome party leaders believed that criticism of the Soviet system, which was nevertheless voiced in Khrushchev’s report atXXcongress, is capable of gradually undermining and destroying socialism in the USSR. The impulsiveness of the First Secretary of the Central Committee, his manner of making public statements without the consent of members of the Presidium of the Central Committee aroused indignation among G.M., Malenkov, V.M. Molotov and L.M. Kaganovich. The latter directly considered Khrushchev a “right-wing deviationist.” They needed a pretext to remove Khrushchev.The condemnation of Stalin's arbitrariness and the recognition of the totalitarian nature of his power were perceived by many as a call for the democratization of society, for the restoration of individual freedom, for the opportunity, at least for communists, to express their opinions. This is what the rank-and-file members of the party, who made up its majority, thought so. They were full of hopes for radical changes in the life of the party and the country; they believed that guarantees would be developed to exclude the possibility of a repetition of the crimes committed by Stalin. But the top of the party, its nomenklatura, as it seemed to it, had already solved its main task: the end of mass repressions, unpredictable attacks on leading party, state, and economic personnel had come, they had gained a certain security. Further de-Stalinization threatened to destroy the foundations of the monopoly power of the party and its dictatorship. The real threat of criticism not only of Stalin, but of the entire regime was felt very quickly in the Central Committee. Two weeks after the 20th Congress, Shepilov made a report to the AON at the CPSU Central Committee. Two communists spoke in the debate and went far beyond criticizing Stalin's cult of personality.The Central Committee had to restore order among the non-party citizens of the country. What was said from the rostrum of the congress by the first secretary of the Central Committee, for ordinary people not only meant disappointment in the “leader”, but also raised doubts about the justice of the entire regime. Trying to save the authority of the party, its leadership put forward an economic program designed to radically improve the financial situation of the country's citizens in a short time. The publications present polar points of view, corresponding to the political position of the authors and press organs. Orthodox Bolsheviks for the first time openly assessed Khrushchev’s report as the beginning of the disaster of the CPSU that occurred in August 1991. Former party reformers described Khrushchev’s report as an important step towards the renewal of the party, the democratization of society, as the beginning of perestroika in the mid-50s, while carrying out analogy with the political reforms of the 80s. They explain the failure of Khrushchev's reform efforts by the resistance of conservative forces within the leadership core of the party. Less clearly expressed is the point of view that the crisis of the party was due to its character, the insoluble contradictions inherent in it. As history has shown, the CPSU was not amenable to reform. The activities of the leading core of the party, in particular, all the decisions of the 20th Congress, were aimed at strengthening the monopoly power of the CPSU in society, at overcoming the extremes that manifested themselves in Stalin's times in the domestic and foreign policy of the USSR, and not at a fundamental rejection of this policy. Attempts to combine such antagonistic principles as democracy and dictatorship turned out to be a utopia. A comprehensive analysis of documents from the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, the Center for the Storage of Modern Documentation, the Archive of the Federal Security Service, the Russian Center for the Storage and Study of Documents of Contemporary History allows us to objectively present a little-known picture of political clashes in the Presidium of the Central Committee, to trace the balance of power on the most important issues discussed at its meetings since the fall of 1955 until the end of February 1956, to show the reaction of society and the party to Khrushchev’s report on Stalin’s personality cult. To a large extent, this was achieved thanks to unique documents found in the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation - recordings of individual meetings of the Presidium of the Central Committee, made by the head of the general department of the CPSU Central Committee V.N. Malin. Far from bureaucratic games and intrigues, Malin recorded discussions in the Presidium of the Central Committee on his own initiative and in secret from everyone, since starting from the 20s, the Politburo did not leave documents compromising the party leadership. After Khrushchev's dismissal, Malin was sent to work as rector of the Academy of Social Sciences (AON) under the CPSU Central Committee. Mikoyan's memoirs are of great interest. They represent dictations on individual issues of history from the 1920s until the October plenum of the Central Committee in 1964. The memoirs are distinguished by their frankness. They report unknown facts in the activities of the Politburo and the relationships between its members. Mikoyan's dictations were never published and from the day of his death were kept in the safe of the head of the general department of the Central Committee under the heading "Especially important special folder." Before these records entered the archive, their readers were only Yu.V. Andropov, M.A. Suslov, K.U. Chernenko and his first assistant V.A. Pribytkov. Analysis of the text dictated by Khrushchev and introduced into scientific circulation for the first time allows the researcher to more accurately imagine Khrushchev’s position and understand his way of thinking. The secret part of the work of the 20th Congress was carefully prepared, and this preparation was accompanied by heated discussions in the Presidium of the Central Committee. Concern among part of the party's leadership about possible prosecution for crimes committed under Stalin grew every day.
The greatest merit of the “secret” report of N.S. Khrushchev's rehabilitation began. The campaign for the rehabilitation of the repressed expanded significantly. But the official rehabilitation of some peoples never happened in the 50s, for example, the Crimean Tatars.Khrushchev managed to become the sole ruler of the Soviet Union.Khrushchev’s success in internal party battles was facilitated by the fact that he accumulated the hopes of the majority of the party apparatus, who feared repression and hated the Stalinist system of power, where controlThe state security agencies also exercised control over the CPSU.
Having removed Molotov and his associates from power, and soHaving eliminated the threat from Marshal Zhukov, Khrushchev established a kind of limited democracy within the ruling party. Despite the fact that the leading role of the party remained unchanged, in fact, within the party itself there was an opportunity to create a blockovs and groups, lobbying associations that foughtfor power both in the center and locally. This system turned out to be more flexible than the direct dictatorial rule of Stalin, but much less controllable from the very top. As a result, it was the gradual introduction of the foundations of internal party democracy that cost Khrushchev
positions of first secretary and leader of the USSR.
Literature.
V.P. Naumov, Khrushchev's Report at 20ccongress of the CPSU,New and recent history. 1996, no. 4.
About the cult of personality and its consequences. Report of the First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, Comrade N.S. Khrushchev. XX Congress of the CPSU
A.A. Danilov, History of Russia 1945-2008, M; Enlightenment, 2009
A.V. Filippov, History of Russia, M; Enlightenment, 2008
Ministry of Education of the Russian Federation
FSBEI HPE "Vyatka State Humanitarian University"
Faculty Institute of History and Culture
Department of National History
Discipline "history"
Essay on the topic “Report of N.S. Khrushchev “On the cult of personality and its consequences”: an ambiguous assessment.”
Performed by a student of the KILP-11 group
Roslyakova Irina Andreevna
Checked by Victoria Vyacheslavovna Mashkovtseva
Kirov 2015
Khrushchev Nikita Sergeevich
About the cult of personality and its consequences
Comrades! In the Report of the Central Committee of the Party to the 20th Congress, in a number of speeches by the delegates of the congress, as well as earlier, at the plenums of the CPSU Central Committee, a lot was said about the cult of personality and its harmful consequences.
After the death of Stalin, the Central Committee of the Party began to strictly and consistently pursue a course to explain the inadmissibility of exalting one individual, alien to the spirit of Marxism-Leninism, turning him into some kind of superman possessing supernatural qualities, like a god. This man seems to know everything, sees everything, thinks for everyone, can do everything, he is infallible in his actions.
This concept of man, and, more specifically, of Stalin, has been cultivated in our country for many years.
This report does not attempt to provide a comprehensive assessment of Stalin's life and work. A sufficient number of books, brochures, and studies were written about Stalin’s merits during his lifetime. Stalin's role in the preparation and conduct of the socialist revolution, in the civil war, and in the struggle to build socialism in our country is well known. Everyone knows this well.
Now we are talking about an issue of great importance both for the present and for the future of the party - we are talking about how the personality cult of Stalin gradually took shape, which at a certain stage turned into the source of a number of major and very serious distortions of party principles, party democracy, revolutionary legality.
Due to the fact that not everyone still understands what the cult of personality led to in practice, what enormous damage was caused by the violation of the principle of collective leadership in the party and the concentration of immense, unlimited power in the hands of one person. The Central Committee of the Party considers it necessary to report materials on this issue to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.
Allow me, first of all, to remind you how severely the classics of Marxism-Leninism condemned any manifestation of the cult of personality. In a letter to the German politician Wilhelm Blos, Marx stated:
“...Out of hostility to any cult of personality, during the existence of the International, I never allowed the numerous appeals in which my merits were recognized and which bothered me from different countries to be made public - I never even answered them, except from time to time to reprimand for them.
The first entry of Engels and myself into the secret society of communists took place under the condition that everything that promotes superstitious admiration of authority would be thrown out of the rules (Lassalle subsequently did just the opposite).”
(Works by K. Marx and F. Engels, vol. XXVI, 1st ed., pp. 487–488).
Somewhat later Engels wrote:
“Both Marx and I, we were always against any public demonstrations in relation to individuals, except only in those cases when it had some significant purpose, and most of all we were against such demonstrations that during our lifetime would concern us personally"
(Op. K. Marx and F. Engels, vol. XXVIII, p. 385).
The greatest modesty of the genius of the revolution, Vladimir Ilyich Lenin, is known.
Lenin always emphasized the role of the people as the creator of history, the leading and organizing role of the party as a living, amateur organism, and the role of the Central Committee.
Marxism does not deny the role of working class leaders in leading the revolutionary liberation movement.
Attaching great importance to the role of leaders and organizers of the masses, Lenin at the same time mercilessly castigated any manifestations of the cult of personality, waged an irreconcilable struggle against the Socialist Revolutionary views of the “hero” and the “crowd”, alien to Marxism, against attempts to oppose the “hero” to the masses, the people.
Lenin taught that the strength of the party lies in its inextricable connection with the masses, in the fact that the people follow the party - workers, peasants, and intelligentsia. “Only he will win and retain power,” said Lenin, “who believes in the people, who plunges into the spring of living folk creativity” (Oc., vol. 26, p. 259).
Lenin spoke with pride about the Bolshevik, communist party as the leader and teacher of the people, he called for bringing all the most important issues to the judgment of class-conscious workers, to the judgment of his party, he declared “we believe in it, in it we see the mind, honor and conscience of our era.” (Works, vol. 25, p. 239).
On February 14, 1956, the 20th Congress of the CPSU was opened. During his work, the delegates discussed the Report of the CPSU Central Committee, the report of the Audit Commission, discussed and adopted the directives of the sixth five-year plan. At the meeting, N. S. Khrushchev was going to read a secret report “On the cult of personality and its consequences.” The issue of preparing and familiarizing the congress delegates with the report was discussed by the party leadership.
The purpose of this report for N.S. Khrushchev was not so much the fight against the “perversions” of the political and social activities of the Soviet government and Stalin personally, but rather the elimination of political rivals from power. Therefore, he believed that speaking about the cult of personality would strengthen his position in the party and state in the struggle for power. This report spoke about mass repressions in the Soviet Union in the 1920s and early 1950s, at a time when the Communist Party was headed by J.V. Stalin. On February 8, the draft report was presented to the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. He shifted his personal responsibility for mass repressions to Stalin and Beria and rehabilitated the Communist Party, the socialist system and himself personally.
All political repressions were blamed personally on Stalin and his entourage. The Communist Party, which he led for more than 30 years, turned out to be a victim of a personality cult. Thus, the question of the party’s guilt before the people was removed. It was not the fault of the government, which was made up of party members.
For N.S. Khrushchev, even dead Stalin was dangerous. Knowing about the repressions and taking an active part in them, Khrushchev, in order to strengthen his personal power, had to maneuver, make concessions, but at the right moment deliver an irresistible blow to his rivals.
There was no discussion or resolution on the content of the report. The party leadership decided to bring its contents to all communists and Komsomol members of the country's primary organizations, but not to publish it.
The consequences of N. S. Khrushchev’s speech “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences” for the public consciousness of people in the mid-20th century are difficult to assess. In general, it was not accepted by the popular masses. N. S. Khrushchev's report was approved by the communists, the leadership of ministries and departments, industrial and agricultural enterprises, and military units.
The Central Committee of the CPSU received a lot of letters and proposals from many ordinary party members and citizens. Basically they were against the monopoly of the party leaders on power.
N. S. Khrushchev’s report laid the foundation for new qualitative conditions for the development of public consciousness. The decisions of the 20th Congress of the CPSU were attractive to the party elite, primarily because the party leadership refused to use repression in the internal party struggle and guaranteed security for the upper and middle layers of the party and state nomenklatura. The possibility of mass repressions was excluded. Condemnation of the cult of personality and the activities of Beria automatically exempted many local leaders, executors and organizers of political processes from responsibility, and positions in the party-state system were also retained.
The report “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences” received great public response. Khrushchev's ideas appealed to a wide range of intelligentsia, primarily the creative ones, who were burdened by the leading role of the party.
Political figures from the largest imperialist countries managed to competently translate Khrushchev's revelations and criticism of Stalin into a campaign to discredit Soviet power. Khrushchev's report contributed to the strengthening of revisionist and opportunist tendencies, sowed confusion in the minds and feelings of progressive-minded people, played into the hands of political opponents of the Soviet Union, which could lead to political destabilization in the countries of the socialist community and a split in the labor movement.
After the 20th Congress of the CPSU, a new stage in the struggle for power began. In order to strengthen his position, N.S. Khrushchev had to adopt a number of resolutions through the CPSU Central Committee, including on the issue of the cult of personality. After analyzing the events in the USSR, the leadership of the Central Committee on June 30, 1956 adopted a resolution “On overcoming the cult of personality and its consequences.” It spoke about the cult of personality as a natural phenomenon in the life of Soviet society. Its emergence was justified by the struggle against obsolete classes, the complexity of the international situation, the threat of intervention and war with Nazi Germany, and most importantly, the acute factional struggle in the ranks of the CPSU (b). The ambiguity of the resolution was manifested in the fact that it stated that I.V. Stalin was an outstanding political figure who fought for the victory of socialism in the USSR, but at the same time, he abused power, destroying many political and party leaders as enemies of the people. N. S. Khrushchev hoped with this resolution to remove the severity of criticism against him, to dirty up rough edges, to shift all responsibility to the NKVD, to his comrades in repression N. I. Ezhov and L. P. Beria.
There are texts on the topic: ""
Report " About the cult of personality and its consequences"(also known as “Khrushchev’s secret report at the 20th Congress of the CPSU”) was read by the First Secretary of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee N.S. Khrushchev at a closed meeting of the 20th Congress of the CPSU, held on February 25, 1956.
The report was devoted to the condemnation of the cult of personality of I.V. Stalin, mass terror and crimes of the second half of the 1930s - early 1950s, the blame for which was placed on Stalin, as well as the problem of rehabilitation of party and military leaders repressed under Stalin. The report was an important stage of the Khrushchev Thaw.
For some [ Who?] assessed as “the most influential report of the 20th century.”
Preparation
Khrushchev’s report is based on materials prepared by the “Pospelov commission”, formed on December 31, 1955 by the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee to “examine the question of how mass repressions became possible against the majority of the entire composition of members and candidates of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party of Bolsheviks, elected by the XVII Congress party." The commission included Pospelov, Komarov, Aristov, Shvernik; Employees of the KGB and the USSR Prosecutor's Office were involved in the work (in particular, the Chairman of the KGB, General I. A. Serov)
The commission's findings were presented on February 9, 1956 at a meeting of the Presidium of the Central Committee. The multi-page document contained only information about repressions against the party and Soviet leadership, and did not touch upon collectivization and “dekulakization”, the problem of Soviet prisoners of war who were repressed after returning from German captivity. Nevertheless, the report clearly outlined a picture of mass repression. The titles of some sections of the report speak for themselves: “Orders of the NKVD of the USSR on mass repressions”, “Artificial creation of anti-Soviet organizations, blocs and various types of centers”, “On gross violations of the law in the investigation process”, “On “conspiracies” in the NKVD bodies” ", "Violations of the law by the prosecutor's office in supervising the investigation in the NKVD", "Judicial arbitrariness of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR", "On extrajudicial consideration of cases".
From the commission’s conclusions it followed that in 1937-1938 more than 1.5 million people were repressed, of which 680 thousand were shot. Of the 139 members and candidates for membership of the CPSU Central Committee, 89 were shot. Of the 1,966 delegates to the XVII Congress, 1,108 people were repressed, of whom 848 were shot. victory of socialism in the USSR.
The document clearly established Stalin's personal responsibility for the use of torture during interrogations, extrajudicial killings and executions. According to the members of the commission, “the opportunity for massive violations of socialist legality” was opened by the Resolution of the USSR Central Executive Committee of December 1, 1934, adopted with violations of procedure in the first hours after the murder of S. M. Kirov and signed by A. S. Enukidze. Mass repressions intensified sharply from the end of 1936 after a telegram from Stalin and Zhdanov, which spoke of the need to appoint Yezhov to the post of People's Commissar of Internal Affairs, since Yagoda “proved not to be up to the task in exposing the Trotskyist-Zinoviev bloc. The OGPU was 4 years late in this matter.”
The commission's report caused heated discussion at the Presidium of the Central Committee. However, on February 13, the day before the start of the 20th Congress, the Presidium of the Central Committee decided to submit to the Plenum a proposal that “at a closed meeting of the congress, make a report on the cult of personality and approve N. S. Khrushchev as the speaker.”
Speech at the congress
A kind of preparation for criticism of Stalin was the speech at the congress of A. I. Mikoyan, who sharply criticized Stalin's Short Course on the History of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), and negatively assessed the literature on the history of the October Revolution, the Civil War and the Soviet state. True, Stalin himself was not mentioned in this speech.
N. S. Khrushchev made a closed report on the last day of work, February 25, at a closed morning meeting. What was unusual was the chosen time of holding - after the plenum of the Central Committee on the election of the leading bodies of the party, which usually closed party forums, and the closed nature of the meeting - without the presence of representatives of foreign communist parties invited to the congress, and the order of conduct - the meeting was led by the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, and not elected by the delegates workers' presidium.
As one of the eyewitnesses of the report, A. N. Yakovlev, recalled, “there was deep silence in the hall. There was no creaking of chairs, no coughing, no whispering. No one looked at each other - either from the surprise of what happened, or from confusion and fear. The shock was unimaginably deep."
It should be taken into account that, as historian R. Pihoya notes: “What Khrushchev read and what Khrushchev said to the delegates of the 20th Congress is not known for certain. It is not possible to establish the degree of correspondence between the printed text of Khrushchev’s report and his oral speech.”
After the end of the speech, N.A. Bulganin, who chaired the meeting, suggested that the debate on the report should not be opened and questions should not be asked.
The congress delegates adopted two resolutions - approving the provisions of the report and on its distribution to party organizations without publication in the open press.
The text of the report contained the following main points:
- Condemnation of Stalin's personality cult;
- Quotes from the classics of Marxism who condemned the “cult of the individual”;
- “Letter to the Congress” (Lenin’s will) and notes by N.K. Krupskaya on the personality of Stalin;
- Stalin's use of the term "enemy of the people" as a weapon of political struggle; before that, the fight against the Trotskyists and the opposition was purely ideological;
- Stalin's violation of the rules of collective leadership;
- Most of the “old Bolsheviks” and delegates of the XVII Congress, who mainly came from workers and joined the CPSU (b) before 1920, were repressed;
- After these repressions, Stalin completely stopped taking into account the principle of collegiality;
- Details of repressions against prominent party members;
- Demand for large-scale repression: the NKVD was “4 years late” in implementing Stalin’s thesis about “strengthening the class struggle”;
- Yezhovshchina, mass falsification of cases aimed at fulfilling “plans” for those convicted and executed;
- Exaggeration of Stalin's role in the Great Patriotic War;
- The Doctors' Case and the Mingrelian Case;
- Manifestations of the cult of personality: songs, names of cities, etc.;
- Text of the USSR Anthem as amended 1944-1956;
- Non-awarding of the Lenin Prize and replacement with the Stalin Prize.
At the end of the report it was said that despite his shortcomings, Stalin had merits for the party, and that he was an outstanding Marxist-Leninist, an ardent supporter of Lenin. Also at the end of the report, Khrushchev said that Stalin pursued the line of personality cult and repression, because he thought that this was right for building communism. “This is Stalin’s tragedy,” Khrushchev said.
Distribution of the report text
The secrecy of the speech was maintained, but individual excerpts were distributed throughout the world, and copies of the speeches went to the leadership of the communist parties of socialist countries (mostly in abridged form). In June, the report first appeared in print in the United States, first in English and then in Russian. Later, the report was distributed in full version to party cells throughout the country, and at a number of enterprises non-party people were also involved in its discussion; There was also frequent discussion of Khrushchev’s report in the Komsomol cells. A “softened” version of the report was published as a resolution of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee on June 30, 1956, entitled “On overcoming the cult of personality and its consequences,” which set the framework for acceptable criticism of Stalinism. This resolution stated that despite his shortcomings, Stalin was a loyal supporter of Lenin and an outstanding Marxist-Leninist. It was also said that the cult of personality did not lead Soviet society away from building communism. The report attracted enormous attention around the world; translations of it appeared into various languages, including those distributed in non-communist circles. The report was first officially published in its entirety in the USSR in 1989 in the journal Izvestia of the Central Committee of the CPSU.
It is known that a number of intelligence agencies around the world tried to get the text of the report, but Israel was the first. So, in Poland, from one of the copies of the text, an employee of the Central Committee of the PUWP, Lucia Baranowska, secretary of Edward Ochab (first secretary of the Central Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party), made a copy and handed over the report to the journalist of the Polish Press Agency, Wiktor Grajewski, who photographed the report and returned the folder to its place. He handed over the folder to the Israeli embassy, which fell into the hands of the head of the Israeli counterintelligence Shin Bet, Amos Manor, and from there it came to the West. In fact, the Mossad, using the services of Graevsky, managed to obtain Khrushchev’s speech. The text of the report was received by David Ben-Gurion, who after reading it stated approximately the following, not only not guessing the timing, but accurately predicting the event he voiced:
If this is not a fake, not disinformation deliberately planted on us, take my word for it - in twenty years there will be no Soviet Union.
Political consequences
Report assessments
Political scientist Ann Appelbaum believes that Khrushchev told a half-truth in his report, because while talking about Stalin’s crimes, he kept silent about his own participation. In her opinion, the purpose of Khrushchev’s report was not only the liberation of compatriots, but also the consolidation of personal power and intimidation of party opponents, who also took part in the repressions
Nikita Sergeevich Khrushchev remains one of the most mysterious and controversial personalities in Russian history. It was under him that the so-called “thaw” occurred in relations with the capitalist world, but at the same time, the world hung on the brink of nuclear war. He came to power in Stalin's favor, but after the latter's death he poured mud from head to toe, reading a report on the cult of personality and its consequences.
J.V. Stalin, or What does the concept of “state personality” mean?
When considering such a complex issue, which reflects information about the results of the impact of an individual person on the internal and external development of the state, the question arises: what kind of person is this? In the modern world, it is believed that one person cannot change the development process of an entire country and society as a whole. However, with some existing forms of power this becomes possible, especially if this person has high strong-willed characteristics that allow her to promote her ideas, i.e. “to stick to your line.”
Starting from the 20s, a strong personality stood at the head of the Soviet state - I.V. Stalin. He managed to carry out his reform activities very successfully for the formation of a totalitarian regime. All power was concentrated in the hands of the party leadership, and this very leadership was “under the hood” of Stalin himself. Over the almost 30-year period of governing the USSR, he managed to radically change the political, economic and social sphere of the country. It must be admitted that he succeeded in a lot. But in many ways there were not only positive facts. There were also terrible, inhumane atrocities for which it is difficult to justify.
Nikita Khrushchev exposed all these negative aspects of his political activity to everyone: both “his own” and “outsiders,” which the latter were very happy about and applauded. This had a profoundly destructive effect on itself within the country.
Closed meeting and “secret report” of Khrushchev
The second part of the congress turned out to be fateful for the development of the USSR and the entire Soviet society. It was said above that the two parts of the congress are unequal - this is indeed so. The first part lasted 11 days and nothing more or less significant happened there. The second part took place on the last day of the congress. Nikita Khrushchev read out a “secret report,” which brought the audience into a state of stupor and deep shock. He debunked the myth of Stalin's personality cult and made him the main and only culprit of mass repressions and other atrocities during all the years of his being in power, i.e. for all 30 years. It is not surprising that it was decided to dispense with debates and discussions of this report - there was deathly silence in the hall during the report, and after it there was no applause, which was an unusual occurrence for this kind of event.
It is not yet possible to reliably find out what exactly Khrushchev said to the delegates. The printed text that has come down to us is edited, and audio tape recordings have not yet been discovered at this time. But, given the fact of improvisation, the report “On the Cult of Personality and Its Consequences” could differ from the text released to the masses for information.
Result and response of the population to the “secret report”
It is very difficult to assess the consequences of Khrushchev’s speech at the 20th Congress. People tend to “pump” from one extreme to another. Until February 25, 1956, Stalin was an “icon”; even the thought of his failure as a politician did not arise, much less the possible atrocities committed by him. The 20th Party Congress spoke about all this. Its historical significance was unpredictable. Most likely, even Nikita Sergeevich himself had no idea what his performance would lead to.
The population was divided in its assessment of the report into two parts - one was in favor and proposed to continue work in this direction, the second part came out sharply against criticism of the leader of all times and peoples.
Letters and notes began to arrive at the Central Committee, proposing to continue the work of debunking the “myth of Stalin.” There were separate proposals for each party member to speak out regarding this issue.
How did the masses find out about this report? The thing is that immediately after the 20th Congress of the Communist Party ended, a large-scale campaign began to familiarize the population of all categories with the text of Khrushchev’s speech.
After which questions were raised about the legality of Stalin’s body being located next to Lenin. Proposals arose for the rehabilitation of such seasoned revolutionaries as Trotsky, Bukharin, Kamenev, Zinoviev, Rakovsky. In addition to them, there were many thousands more proposals to return the good name of illegally convicted Soviet citizens.
Bloody events in Tbilisi
A separate moment was the events in Tbilisi, which gave rise to the 20th Party Congress. The year 1956 became tragic for the Georgian people. Nikita Sergeevich needed to understand what his careless words could lead to. Georgia was Stalin's birthplace. During the time that he was in power, he gained such authority that they began to call him a demigod and began to deify him. By the way, to this day there remains a special attitude towards him in Georgia. The secret report was read out at the end of February 1956, and already in March mass unrest began.
Khrushchev could have sent experienced propagandists to Georgia who could explain everything “correctly” and convey it to the population. But Nikita Sergeevich was not interested in this - he sent punitive forces there. The result was a lot of bloodshed. To this day in Georgia, Khrushchev is remembered with an unkind word.
Historical significance
Khrushchev's report had mixed results. Firstly, it marked the beginning of democratization in public administration - repression and terror in party struggle were prohibited. But, at the same time, the authorities did not want to give the population much freedom in action. Meanwhile, young people, as the most progressive part of society, understood the events taking place in politics in their own way. He believed that the time of shackles was in the past, real freedom had come.
But it was a mistake. Khrushchev wanted to return everything back, to slow down the process of de-Stalinization, but it was already too late, and now he had to adapt to the ongoing events aimed towards democracy.
The party leadership did not change because of this - it remained the same, but everyone wanted to blame Stalin and Beria as much as possible, thereby presenting their activities in a more attractive light.
The decision of the congress on the general propaganda of Khrushchev’s “secret report” led to great changes, but even the top leaders did not understand what consequences this would lead to. As a result, the process of destruction of the state structure of a society of universal equality began.
"Thaw"
The second half of the 50s - mid-60s of the 20th century entered Russian history as the period of the Khrushchev Thaw. This is the time when the development of the USSR turned from totalitarianism to something resembling democracy. Relations with the capitalist world improved, the “Iron Curtain” became more permeable. Under Khrushchev, an international youth festival was organized in Moscow.
The persecution of party workers was stopped, many of those convicted under Stalin were rehabilitated. A little later, ordinary citizens were subject to rehabilitation. At the same time, the acquittal of traitor peoples took place, which included the Chechens, Ingush, Germans and many others.
The peasantry was freed from “collective farm slavery” and the working week was shortened. The people accepted this optimistically, which had an overall positive impact on the country's economy. Active construction of housing space has begun throughout the country. To this day, there is no city in Russia or other countries of the former Soviet Union that does not have at least one Khrushchev building.
The 20th Party Congress was an event not only on an intra-Soviet scale, but also on an international one. For his speech at this congress, Khrushchev was forgiven for a lot - the Hungarian events, the bloody massacre in Tbilisi and Novocherkassk, admiration for the West, his personal active participation in repressive actions during the reign of I. Stalin, a boorish and arrogant attitude towards the intelligentsia. During the years of perestroika, there were even proposals to rebury Nikita Sergeevich at the foot of the Kremlin wall. Yes, of course, he became a world figure as a result of one famous speech. It’s like Churchill after the Fulton speech, who announced the beginning of the Cold War and instantly became a central figure in world politics.